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HOW DOES THE NATIONAL GUARD BECOME RELEVANT, READY AND REACTIVE?
Why is it taking the National Guard so long to get into the fight? This is a question that has perplexed the Secretary of Defense and Combatant Commanders who desperately need these forces to execute the missions against multiple threats confronting our nation. The answer lies within the process and method by which the National Guard (NG) is trained, mobilized and deployed. The mobilization process by which the NG is activated and validated in response to national emergencies is hindering its responsiveness to the needs of the Nation.
This process is outlined in FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2, 500-3-1 and 500-3-3. The multiple layers of oversight, application of training management and methods of evaluation represent a series of redundant checks and balances designed to confirm the readiness levels of the NG and its ability to execute any given mission prior to being deployed into theater. This process involves redundancies that, at face value, question the integrity of the leaders of the NG units and serve to undermine the team building efforts of the Total Army concept. They also invalidate the training accomplished by the soldiers of the units themselves. The NG can deploy into theater and conduct combat and combat support missions within the normal prescribed timelines assigned to Regular Army units if needless redundancy is reduced.
Removal of these redundancies would, serve three purposes; it would get the Guard into the Area of Responsibility (AOR) and relieve the deployment strain on the Regular Army, it would reduce the amount of time that a Guard unit is deployed and thus reduce the amount of time a
Guardsman is away from his civilian job and family, and finally, it would support the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) initiative of creating one Army. The purpose of this paper is to address the challenges that prevent the expeditious deployment of the NG and propose changes in the way that the NG is trained, evaluated and validated in order to meet the needs of the Nation.
NATIONAL GUARD DESIGN AND CHANGING ROLES
The NG is an integral part of National Power and has been heavily relied upon to execute missions in support of the National Security Strategy. 1 This is a drastic change from the past roles that the Guard had performed since the Vietnam conflict. It is one that has come as a result of a concerted effort executed by the NG and the AC in the early 90's to make the Guard combat ready and deployable. 2 Currently, there are 8 Guard Divisions, one Light Cavalry Regiment and fifteen Enhanced Separate Brigades (eSB) which comprise 56 % of the combat, 40% of the combat support and 34% of the combat service support forces of the Army. In addition, the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act (ANGCRRA) requires the ARNG ground combat maneuver brigades and CS/CSS units considered essential for execution of the national strategy to be associated with an AC unit and prescribes responsibilities for associated AC commanders. 3 However, the current level of integration and oversight only focuses on the eSBs. Only the eSBs are apportioned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The ARNG Divisions and strategic reserve brigades are not. Rather, each of the ARNG combat units that are not apportioned is aligned with a designated AC Corps. The SECDEF has ordered a restructure of the Guard in order to establish the proper AC/RC mix of units. These changes would take support units from the RC and place them back into the AC. 4 In addition, the method by which RC units are trained and evaluated is under scrutiny in order to make the RC units more responsive to mobilizations and able to deploy into theater in an expeditious manner.
WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?
The current perception held by the AC component is that the NG is taking too long to validate in order to deploy. 5 The reality of the situation is a dual edge sword which continues to cut the Guard out of the picture and prevents it from reactively deploying. The mobilization process is the most obvious cause preventing the Guard from being fully engaged. Questions have been asked by both the AC and RC sides as to whether it is an overly redundant and irrelevant process that hinders the reactiveness of the Guard to execute it's National Security mission. The second obstacle is the lack of an established command relationship and therefore lack of coordinated planning which fits the Guard assets into the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) and guarantees the availability of transportation assets needed to get the Guard units and their equipment into theater. There simply are not enough transportation assets to simultaneously move the Guard in an expeditious manner into a theater of operation along with the AC units who are deploying to support a Combatant Commander.
What are the limitations to transporting troops into a theater of operation? Is the Guard, by virtue of its heavy structure, preventing its own effective use? Has the original concept of making the Guard the heavy mechanized forces to serve as the strategic reserve outlived its usefulness? The current global environment and shift in National Security Strategy has answered these questions and spurred a need for a change in mission for the Guard. The force requirement to support peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations calls for lighter, more mobile forces. Clearly, these missions have to be executed and cannot wait while units transform themselves. There are three possible solutions to these problems addressing these current and future needs of a combatant commander. Transformation, and the push towards the Objective Force, could leave the NG behind as the Army moves towards creating lighter and more agile forces. This is a reality that the Guard currently reflects based on its original design, which was to be the heavy mechanized force that would serve as the strategic reserve. The NG's responsibility with respect to transformation is to maintain its viability and relevance. Two key issues have to be addressed in order for the NG to meet its goal; translating its level of training proficiency and abilities to the AC and being able to deploy into a theater of operation within a timely manner so as to be an affective player in a combatant commander's plan. LTG Blum, the Commander of National Guard Bureau (NGB), initiated the step towards transformation of the Guard by transforming his headquarters into a Joint Headquarters by consolidating the Air NG and Army NG Headquarters. He also tasked the State Adjutant Generals (AG) to transform their headquarters.
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CURRENT MISSION AND RELEVANCE:
Relevance is the resounding word that describes the current focus of the NG, and there is an evident need for the NG to play a major role in support of the National Objectives. As a key player in National Power, the Guard has taken on greater responsibilities for securing the Guard needs to change its structure and method of operation in order to remain a viable part of National Power and a key player in the Nation's Strategic Plan.
The "American internationalism" basis of the National Security Strategy (NSS) established three goals that had to be attained in order to make the world a better and safer place to live in. 9 The three goals incorporate the use of both peaceful and military elements of power. The NSS outlined by President Bush defines the defense of the Nation against all enemies as the primary focus of the Federal Government. 10 The NG has deployed approximately 232,000 soldiers within the last two years in support of the war on terrorism. 11 This is greater than the mobilization during WWII. 12 Currently, the Guard has approximately 170,000 soldiers on active duty and the Department of Defense plans for a third multi-national division that does not seem likely to materialize. 13 The likely choice to fill this requirement falls on the Guard. This only adds to the mounting recruiting and retention problems that the Guard is currently facing. The "weekend warrior" mentality is no longer valid in the mind-set of the general public and especially the soldiers who are in the Guard. The reality is one to two year deployments into countries like Iraq and Bosnia instead of duty within their respective States. Consequently, the Guard is 13,459 soldiers short of meeting its recruiting goals of 62,000 by the end of September
2003.
14 The Guard has lost its reputation of being a safe place to be while in military service, because deployments in hostile areas have become its reality. In addition, the returning soldiers have posed a retention risk. The possibility of multiple deployments occurring for a given RC unit is reducing the likelihood that an RC soldier will re-enlist when his commitment to the military ends. 15 The long-term effect of dwindling troop strength figures may cause an imbalance in the relation of elements of power with respect to the capability of the military to accomplish its mission.
IMPACT OF DEPLOYMENTS:
The impact of these deployments has had a drastic effect on domestic operations, The high probability of future deployments occurring has prompted the need to insure that the proper types of forces exist between the AC and RC. SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld, "… has ordered a rebalancing of the force to provide a better mix of capabilities between the active and reserve components". 18 This is a vital and timely task that will adversely affect the readiness levels of many units if they are forced to re-designate to a different specialty. The question is when will these soldiers train in their new specialty given the need to execute missions now?
They will not be deployable for two years given the time needed and availability of school seats to retrain soldiers and gain proficiency at the collective level of training. The duties that these, and other units are performing while deployed often do not support a majority of their Military
Occupational Specialty (MOS), thus, compounding the problems of maintaining readiness levels. Their peacekeeping roles prevent them from training within these MOS' and prevent the performance of collective training. The training readiness level of the units will eventually drop within certain specialty areas and would contribute towards degrading the overall readiness of the Guard.
HOW TO FIX IT:
Given that the demands to respond to global and domestic crisis will not end and that the duality of command structure for the Guard will remain in tact, the Guard has to change its strategy and focus. The Guard has to accomplish three objectives in order to transform and be able…"… to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results". 19 First, the Guard needs to determine what it can accomplish now. Second, it must analyze its current force structure with respect to the current world situation and determine what type of forces is needed. Third, it must define its role with respect to National Security. There are three possible COA that the Guard can take to attain these objectives. An analysis of these COAs using the criteria of the ends, ways and means framework will result in identifying the best COA. The COA 1 maintains the status quo and would allow the Guard to accomplish its current missions, but would eventually lead to its demise with respect to recruitment, retention and readiness. The Guard units would execute the current peacekeeping operations and be prepared to fill in to perform peace enforcement operations. These missions will not end and will eventually take its toll on the soldiers as they rotate from one Area of Operation (AOR) to another. It is the easiest of the three to accomplish, because it does not require any change.
However, it avoids the entire issue of the mission load that is affecting the Divisions did not support each other's. There was also a lack oversight for the partnership in that it did not have the necessary emphasis and commitment from both parties. There was also a disparity in equipment capability and inter-operability.
The NG was unable to be as flexible as the AC Divisions because it was operating on a two year rigid training plan, which had resources and manpower committed to specific missions.
In addition, the NG Divisions had to answer to two headquarters, the State and NGB with the State having more direct control. The AC Divisions in turn had to execute real world missions, which were not pre-planned and therefore not within the Guard's 2 year training plan.
Consequently, the Division Headquarters' could not commit to a plan nor guarantee to meet requirements. The planning cycles between Divisions and training focus were not synchronized and consequentially, the support packages that were deployed were either not prepared or the wrong mix of specialties. 20 So, in order to make this COA viable, the issues of training commitment, mission load, funding and modernization of equipment have to be addressed in order to field capable forces that are able to defeat any threat. 21 COA 2 calls for FORSCOM, the NGB and STARC commitment towards inter-operability and compatibility. It also requires centralized planning and coordination between the Division headquarters to occur in order to insure that RC units meet mission requirements, attain required readiness levels, and establish habitual relationships with their AC counterparts. The current plan for ways and means are not at the necessary levels needed to achieve the ends. Not all of the Guard Divisions are at the readiness levels necessary to deploy. Deployable RC units need additional funding to pay their personnel for additional training days and maintain their equipment. This task is attainable given the proper emphasis and support from NGB and the State. The risk for this COA is that the cooperative relationship between the Divisions would become directly tied to their respective commanders and that this relationship would end when the commander's tenure ended. The only way to mitigate this risk is to have legislative directives that would mandate cooperative execution of missions that are maintained by FORSCOM and NGB.
COA 3 calls for reorganizing the guard divisions into units in highest demand; light infantry, military police, transportation, etc. This COA is a long-term solution and will fix the imbalance that occurs between current force structure and mission requirement. This, however, will take at least two years to achieve given recruiting, retention and readiness issues. Past transformations following a war have left a majority of the senior commissioned and noncommissioned officers in the Guard unable to convert into a different specialty and remain and thus, created a void in leadership and experience. 22 The newly formed units will have to allow these leaders to remain in position until they retire or hold the place for new leaders to arrive.
The allotment of school seats is another obstacle in this transformation. The MOS producing schools will not be able to produce the amount of throughput within a short time frame to meet the demands of the units. 23 This will bring in a fourth player who would have to be flexible in its methods. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) will have to establish an accessible and reactive process to train these newly formed units. The risk with this COA is that the readiness levels of the units will be drastically be reduced and that they cannot accomplish any assigned mission.
A comparison of the three COAs using relevance, funding and recruiting and retention, and readiness levels and mission accomplishment as the criteria for analysis reveals that COA 2 is the best COA for the Guard to adopt to meet the demands of the current situation. COA 1 does not allow the Guard to meet the total needs of country in exercising its National Power since it is primarily focused on the domestic environment. Therefore, it does not maintain its relevance with respect to (Ends) and the National Grand Strategy. In addition, the continued deployment cycle and reduced levels of readiness will make it's units unable to sustain the deployments and mission in general, making it unable to meet the (Ways) requirement of the National Grand Strategy. The reduced manning levels due to ineffective recruiting and retention of soldiers would eventually make the units non-deployable and therefore negating the (Means)
by which the National Power can be leveraged. 24 COA 3 does not allow the Guard to meet the current needs of the Nation in that it requires too much time to reorganize and train soldiers and units to execute the mission effectively, however, it has implications for its transformational role in the future. The total re-designation of units into different specialties would cause significant resistance from the citizens and organizations within each affected state. A majority of the soldiers within the units usually live within the community where the unit is armored. These armories have usually been a part of each respective community for years. A re-designation of any unit will displace a significant portion of each unit. This is especially detrimental if a unit changed from a service support role to a combat role. This will leave female soldiers without a unit within their hometown.
TRAINING:
The Guard apportions 48 Unit Training Assemblies in which they can pay their soldiers to train throughout the training year. These are the weekend drills that are conducted monthly. The developments that have occurred within the global environment have made our Nation the sole great power responsible for maintaining peace throughout the world. We, as a nation, are working diligently to balance the use of our national power to attain our national objectives. 25 Clearly, the NG has to change the way it operates in order to stay relevant. The demands of the global and domestic environments and its requirement to support the National Strategy dictates it. The NG, as part of National Power, has a directed and inherent responsibility to defend the United States of America. 26 The question is will the National Guard be able to effectively balance the "remarkable trinity" within its arena during this transformation in order to support the Nation's core Grand Strategy and make the leap to remain relevant through transformation into the future.
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